Introduction
In a 1987 New York Times article, Mark C. Taylor described the twentieth-century intellectual attitude toward language and meaning. He said, "Heidegger argued that the totalistic thinking of modern philosophy leads to a form of totalitarianism that represses all difference and also to a system of technology which, in its quest to control the whole earth, threatens annihilation in a nuclear holocaust…Western philosophy represents so many efforts to domesticate every type of difference and master all forms of otherness."
1 Statements such as these depend on the assumption that those who claim that their language games are externallyreferential of a common world (in this case, western philosophers) are not motivated by factuality or objectivity but by the repression of difference and, presumably, the need for dominance.
Such a position, however, is merely symptomatic of an earlier and more foundational philosophical and linguistic thesis introduced by the nineteenth-century philologist Ferdinand de 1 Mark Taylor, "Descartes, Nietzsche, and the Search for the Unsayable," The New York Times, Feb. 1, 1987. Saussure. In his works on semiotics and semiology, de Saussure challenged the prevailing theories on language, which he redefined as internally-differential, not externally-referential. Saussure that the enlightenment theorists "began with mental categories and sought their exemplification in language, as in universal grammar, and based etymologies on conjectures about the origin of language. The latter sought only facts, evidence, demonstration: it divorced the study of language from the study of mind." 4 Thus, decentered from universal mind, language became the malleable expression of minds and of competing language games.
Ferdinand de Saussure's Linguistics
Ferdinand de Saussure was among the first to propose the notion that language was not merely a means by which objects were studied; language was itself an object study -one that had nothing definitive to say about any external objects. Jonathan Culler notes that, according to de Saussure's lectures, "Linguistics…never attempted to describe the nature of the object it was studying." 5 To him and his contemporaries, it became clear that even one line of speech was unexpectantly complex and could be analyzed from a range of contrary perspectives. Instead of determining the relationship between language and that to which it refers, de Saussure set himself to decipher the range of factors and conflicting points of view within linguistic sets. De
Saussure accomplished this by redefining the function of signs and their signification.
De Saussure considered language to be an organization of signs. Signs, contra the eighteenthcentury theorists, functioned as both subjects and objects within systems of signification and contained two elements, the significant (or that which signifies) and the signifie (the signified).
Importantly, both the significant and signifie are elements of the sign and only exist within the sign. 6 Consequently, if that which is signified (the signifie) refers to the structure of the sign and not to an external object, and if language is the only means by which that object may be described, then objects as they exist (or are thought to exist) cannot be described metalinguistically. The relationships between subjects and predicates are meaningful only in relation to the historical and consensual rules of the particular language game in which these are uttered.
But just as intertextual meaning can be determined by studying the relations between the components of the sign, so too can intertextual meaning be acquired by studying the relationships between the signs themselves. This is de Saussure's theory of difference.
According to de Saussure, the meaning of a sign cannot be determined positively or in isolation from other signs. It is only by analyzing the network of signs and the negations of these that the interpreter can elicit meaning from language. Jonathan Culler states, "It is understood that these concepts are purely differential, not positively defined by their content but negatively defined by their relations with other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is that they are what the others are not." 7 Illustrative of this, de Saussure has emphasized the futility of requires the linguist to first determine the "structures of signification" that determine "social ground and import" 9 ; one must "consider the signifying intention of the speaker, the aspects of the world to which his utterance refers, the immediate circumstances of the communicative context which might have led him to produce a particular series of noises. This is certainly problematic for historiography, which seems to postulate the transhistorical reality of such concepts as time, change (perhaps causation), and space.
(2) To the extent that history is the description of past states, history is impossible. Put simply, if the signs of which historical narratives are composed do not refer to nonnarrative objects (past states), then historical narratives cannot describe past states but 13 Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure, 15. only the present state to which the narrative belongs. Historiography is restricted to describing the wishes and interests of the historian -not the history.
(3) Any historical narrative cannot (with integrity) describe anything more than an extremely small data set. Universal and civilizational histories (of the kind composed by Herodotus, Gibbon, Toynbee, and others) become physically impossible due to the infinitely multiplying network of signs and differences ("winks upon winks upon winks" in the words of Geertz) which must be analyzed. 14 Consequently, historical narratives must "fly so low to the ground" that they risk describing nothing but trees, blinded to the complicated ecosystems in which trees are meaningful. But this creates a limitation, one related to the following problem of difference. Historiographies limited to small data sets fail to define themselves as differentiated from, and therefore meaningful in relation to, other sets of meaning. For example, the historian committed to cataloging the signs, differences, and "winks" of the working conditions of women during the industrial revolution may fail (must fail!) to describe broader social and economic conditions, without which the former cannot have meaning. (Where do the winks end?) Ironically, the condition which necessitates small data sets inevitably requires the expansion of these in search of meaning.
(4) Historical narratives must assume difference and negation where there may not be any.
De Saussure's contention that the meaning of signs can only be determined in negative relation to other signs imposes a restrictive and arbitrary historical methodology.
Meaning as difference is an a priori presupposition that opposition, contradiction, and negation are necessary properties of the ideas, concepts, institutions, classes, individuals, 14 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 9. events, and data of historical study, whether or not these differences are native to the ideas, concepts, etc.
(5) Historical narratives can no longer function as a vehicle for truth and reconciliation between groups of competing language games. Barring the possibility for historical narratives to equitably describe the common past states of antagonistic people groups, by what method can these groups transcend the particularities of their language game to ascertain historical truth and achieve reconciliation? (This is, admittedly, not a philosophical but a practical implication of the de Saussurean theory.)
Oxford academic and scholar Jane Caplan summarizes, "'Saussure claims…that meaning in language is the product not of reference to things exterior to it, but of a system of difference internal to language as a code...these emphasize the arbitrariness of any system of signification, and to detach it from external reference, whether to the past or to the real, as the guarantee of its meaning or truth. 
